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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to illustrate the Ricœurian contribution to the development of a 
hermeneutics of otherness. Beginning with Ricœur’s confrontation with Heideggerian 
thought on temporality, the paper proceeds to develop the connection between time and 
narrative as an answer to the aporias of time, discovered in the analysis of the 
cosmological and existential idea of time. In conclusion, the third part will outline the 
importance of the narrative conception of temporality in the development of a 
hermeneutics of otherness. 
Keywords 


















Researcher, University of Perugia (IT). 
 
P E R I    v .  0 6    n .  0 2    2 0 1 4    p . 1 5 2 - 1 7 3  1 5 3   
 
This paper intends to investigate the relationship between time, narrative, and 
what can be called a hermeneutics of otherness. It is beyond doubt that the philosophy 
of Paul Ricœur made a fundamental contribution to the development to the theme of 
otherness in the field of hermeneutical research. Time, narrative and the hermeneutics of 
otherness can be considered as three strictly linked elements. This connection is deeply 
rooted in the history of hermeneutics, beginning with the great turn matured with 
Heidegger’s philosophy. The German thinker was the first to underline, in the 
connection between being and time, the possibility to evidence the “difference” in its 
radical dialectic with “identity”
1
. Heidegger unquestionably remains far from the 
elaboration of a notion of otherness, as expressed in Ricœur’s thought. However, it is 
possible to put in light the theoretical root shared by the two thinkers in the ontological 
relationship between time and being. 
In this sense Ricœurian hermeneutics can be considered as a critical heir of the 
Heideggerian perspective. In fact, Ricœur approves the Heideggerian turn in 
hermeneutics, which began in Being and Time, and in particular some premises 
concerning the theme of the sense of being and its aesthetical declination. In particular, 
it must be underlined how in the most important parts of Ricœur’s works, where the 
theoretical discussion becomes harder and deeper, Heidegger is frequently cited as a 
critical landmark
2
. On the other hand, Heidegger’s thought is fundamental in order to 
consider the question concerning the relationship between time and being as a basis to 
develop a hermeneutics of otherness. 
Beginning with the interest showed by Ricœur in the theme of temporality 
proposed by Heidegger, the present study intends to analyze three basilar connections: 
1) the Ricœurian reading of Heideggerian temporality; 2) the development of the 
                                                        
1
 Cfr. Heidegger’s essays on identity and difference, in particular Heidegger: 1976, 123-176, Heidegger: 
1982, and Heidegger: 1994. The Heideggerian concept of “ontological difference” can be considered in 
contemporary hermeneutics as the first act of thinking the difference as itself part of the horizon of 
radical ontology. Thinking the difference is the first basis on which it is possible to criticize the 
dominion of the identity in western philosophy, attempting to overcome it in the direction of an 
alternative thought. The possibility of a hermeneutics of otherness is rooted in this first heideggerian 
attempt. 
2
 It should be remembered that behind the discussion on the problem of temporality in Time and 
Narrative 3, in particular Ricœur: 2003, 359-370, here the French philosopher faces the problem of the 
metaphor which is very close to the Heideggerian idea of poetry. On the Ricœurian comparison with 
Heidegger see in particular: Clayton: 1989, Greisch: 1989, Bourgeois-Schalow: 1990, Kemp: 1996, 
Jervolino: 1996, Bourgeois: 1999. 
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narrative dimension as an answer to the aporias observed in the heideggerian concept of 
temporality; 3) the importance of a concept of narrativity for a hermeneutics of 
otherness. 
1.The Question of Temporality: Ricœur as a Critical Heir of Heideggerian 
Thought. 
Ricœur discusses the Heideggerian concept of temporality in the third volume of 
Time and Narrative. Here the French thinker analyzes the aporias of temporality in the 
philosophies of St. Augustin, Husserl and Heidegger. The significance of the Ricœurian 
analysis is to put in light the limits of a phenomenology of time. It is well known that 
this phenomenology pays particular attention to the “inner time-consciousness”, 
establishing the supremacy of the transcendental aspect of temporality. On the other 
hand, however, the other side of temporality, which concerns the objective forms of 
time considered in its computable, public and chronological aspect, remains unsolved. 
This aspect, for a phenomenology of time, remains of less importance than the former. 
Ricœur arrives at the analysis of the Heideggerian position after crossing the 
aporias of temporality, which arise from the confrontation between Augustin and 
Aristotle, and Husserl and Kant. These two pairs of thinkers demonstrate the aporetic 
contrast between the two different interpretations of time. In Augustin and in Husserl 
we can see the highest example of a phenomenology of time completely projected to the 
inner analysis of the temporal dynamic of a singular existence. By contrast Aristotle and 
Kant show a non-existential but no less important idea of time: this is time considered 
as a becoming of unvarying instants, not signed by the kairos typical of existential time. 
This is chronos considered as a quantitative measurement of “before” and “after”, as a 
measurement of the changes happening in the world; time that the Greeks conceived as 
an interchange of “genesis kai phtora”, of the birth and the destruction of everything in 
the world. From this point of view, Ricœur underlines as “a psychological theory and a 
cosmological theory mutually occlude each other to the very extent they imply each 
other” (RICŒUR: 1990(3), 14). 
Faced with this alternative, the underlying problem is the following: the question 
concerning the aporia of temporality makes it impossible to have a panoramic view of 
time. We can not see time in its totality. The aporetical relationship between 
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phenomenological and cosmological conception of time signifies our incapability to 
reach a vision sub specie aeternitatis, because our time and the time of the world are not 
the same thing. In other words, the phenomenological and the cosmological 
interpretations of time can not be unified in a universal synthesis and overcome in a 
superior point of view. 
However, the aporetic approach to the problem of temporality does not 
absolutely deny the possibility to reach for a sort of unity for the multiplicity of time. 
When Ricœur defines time as a “common singularity”, he has in mind to consider the 
question concerning time to find a sense for it, a unity for the multiplicity of which time 
is the essential principle.  
How is it possible to connect the one and the multiple, the unity of 
consciousness and the multiplicity of perceptible data? How is it possible to consider at 
the same time the unity of the soul and its various and variable historical and existential 
experiences? How is it possible to build up horizons of sense in the temporal and 
historical becoming of the world? All these questions can be understood in the question 
concerning the aporia between the time of the soul and the time of the world, as 
proposed by Ricœur in the third volume of Time and Narrative. 
Ricœur introduces the Heideggerian position, pointing out that the question 
about temporality and environmentality of consciousness proposed by the german 
thinker in Sein und Zeit, seems to suspend the previously observed aporia. With the idea 
of Dasein as an In-der-Welt-sein, in fact, the dichotomy between time of the soul and 
time of the world could be resolved by reaching a conciliation. If the being which 
questions its own being, starting from the temporality of its being-in-the-world, a 
wordly located conscience, it means that with the Heideggerian Dasein we can 
overcome the difficulties proposed by the aporia of temporality. With the idea of being-
in-the world Heidegger has radically resolved the duality between subject and object 
giving the impression of establishing the basis for a unification of the temporality under 
a unitary idea. 
However, it is precisely against this radical turn proposed by Heidegger that 
Ricœur criticizes in particular the idea of temporality. Ricœur is in fact sceptical about 
the resolutive capacity of the Heideggerian conception of time. The problem concerns 
the analysis of the temporality, which Heidegger deduces from the idea of the being-
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toward-death proposed as the critical point for the authenticity or inauthenticity of 
Dasein. This existentive repercussion
3
 is what makes it possible for the Dasein to be 
brought back to his authentic self. The decision for the authenticity of the self against 
the being-towards-death produces the access to the ecstatic temporality through the 
opening of a future (Zukunft), which is the coming into presence of what has always 
been
4
. Ricœur underlines in particular the preposition “zum” of the Heideggerian 
expression Sein-zum-Tode, which recalls openly the preposition of the Zu-Kunft: “In 
Care, Dasein aims at coming toward itself in accordance with its ownmost possibilities. 
Coming-towards (Zukommen) is the root of the future” (RICŒUR: 1990(3), 69). In this 
opening towards the future, care (Sorge) discloses itself to its authentical being as it 
discovers its destiny in the being-toward-death, the extreme coincidence of its necessity 
and possibility. The disclosure of the temporal ecstasis in the instant of the decision of 
authenticity entails that time concentrates in a unity in itself differentiated. 
Ricœur underlines as the temporalization proposed by Heidegger recalls very 
nearly the idea of distentio animi pointed out by Augustin: “The Augustinian problem of 
the threefold present is simply carried over to temporalization taken as a whole” 
(RICŒUR: 1990(3), 71). In that case, if the authentic temporality is a concentration and 
an unification as a consequence of the totalizing event of the being-toward-death as the 
distentio animi in the Augustin Confessiones, remains unsolved the problem posed by 
Ricœur concerning the unity of time between phenomenology and cosmology. The 
ecstatic unity of the temporality in the authentic “care” is the apex of an intimate 
experience of time which, even if it conceives the conscience no longer as a soul (like in 
Augustin) or as a transcendental subject (as in Husserl), but as a being-in-the-world, 
                                                        
3
 The theme of death is strongly criticized by Ricœur as the only moment for the acquisition of 
authenticity. As he says: “If we withdraw from mortality the capacity to determine by itself alone the 
level of radicalness on which temporality can be thought, we do not thereby weaken the mode of 
questioning that guides the investigation of temporality (Chapter 3). Quite the opposite. If the 
potentiality of Dasein to be a whole – or, as we might say, its capacity for being integral – ceases to be 
governed solely by the consideration of Being-towards-the-end, the potentiality-of-Being-a-whole can 
once be carried back to the power of unification, articulation, and dispersion belonging to time” 
(RICŒUR: 1990(3), 67-68). 
4
 As Heidegger says: “‘Zu-kunft’ meint hier nicht ein jetzt, das, noch nicht ‘wirklich’ geworden, einmal 
erst sein wird, sondern die Kunft, in der das Dasein in seinem eigensten Seinkönnen auf sich zukommt. 
Das Vorlaufen macht das Dasein eigentlich zukünftig, so zwar, dass das Vorlaufen selbst nur möglich 
ist, sofern das Dasein als seiendes überhaupt schon immer auf sich zukommt, das heisst in seinem Sein 
überhaupt zukünftig ist. […] Das Vorlaufen in die äusserste und eigenste Möglichkeit ist das 
verstehende Zurückkommen auf das eigenste Gewesen. Dasein kann nur eigentlich gewesen sein, es 
zukünftig ist. Die Gewesenheit entspringt in gewisser Weise der Zukunft” (HEIDEGGER: 1977, 431). 
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nevertheless it leaves open the question of the relationship that this favourite experience 
of authenticity maintains with other levels of temporality like historicity 
(Geschichtlichkeit) and within-time-ness (Innerzeitigkeit). 
So Ricœur can argue that, like Augustine, Heidegger invites us to think of a 
hierarchy of the levels of temporality. As with Augustin, Heidegger ascends towards the 
apex of the experience of time. At the same time, however, Heidegger, like Augustin, 
remains in an aporetic situation when he must deduce from the authentic experience of 
time the less qualitative but more quantitative modalities of experiencing time itself. 
The problem of Heidegger is therefore to descend from the apex, to climb down the 
stairway, which brings to the intimate, exclusive and singular experience of time, in 
order to achieve the lower levels of temporality which involve a public, communitarian 
and intersubjective dimension. The time that I experience, looking death in the eye, 
isolates me in an instant which can not be communicated to others, but the human world 
is not only made of isolated existences but also people who interact in a common space 
interwoven in a public temporality. 
The limit of the Heideggerian conception of time appears when Heidegger tries 
to pass through the temporality of the single existence toward a common historicity. 
This is what Heidegger determines as the Geschick, the “common destiny” of a nation, 
which should function as a mediation between the singular and the collective idea of 
time
5
. Heidegger, for Ricœur, is incapable of putting in relation the private time of 
Dasein with the public time of the intersubjectivity, frustrating the possibility of a 
storiographic debate and the truthfulness of an epistemological approach to the 
historical world that can be discussed and judged by the community. All this is due to 
the fact that Heidegger relies entirely on the idea of authenticity, which becomes the 
basis on which to assess other forms of temporality. As Ricœur underlines: “The calls to 
authenticity wins out over the concern to take the step from ontology to epistemology, 
even though the necessity to do so is not contested” (Ricœur: 1990(3), 80). Here we can 
find the greater distance that discerns Ricœur from Heidegger and from the entire 
                                                        
5
 “Wenn aber das schicksalhafte Dasein als In-der-Welt-sein wesenhaft im Mitsein mit Anderen 
exisistiert, ist sein Geschehen ein Mitgeschehen und bestimmt als Geschick. Damit bezeichnen wir das 
Geschehen der Gemeinschaft, des Volkes. Das Geschick setz sich nicht aus einzelnen Schicksalen 
zusammen, sowenig als das  Miteinandersein  alse in Zusammenvorkommen mehrerer Subjekte 
begriffen werden kann. […] Das schicksalhafte Geschick des Daseins in und mit seiner ‘Generation’ 
macht das volle, eigentliche Geschehen des Dasein aus” (HEIDEGGER: 1977, 508). 
 
P E R I    v .  0 6    n .  0 2    2 0 1 4    p . 1 5 2 - 1 7 3  1 5 8   
phenomenology of time in general. What he criticizes in the phenomenological 
hermeneutics in its entirety is that it has renounced the epistemological approach typical 
of the human sciences, in order to achieve immediate access to the theme of the sense of 
being
6
. Also the relationship between time and being proposed by Heidegger is implied 
by this fault: indeed, in Heidegger’s hermeneutics the access to the sense of being is 
guaranteed by the manifestation of the being itself in time, without any form of 
mediation. With that every methodological or epistemological need is overcome, which 
remains as an unresolved attachment for the reflection that cannot be integrated.  
What is at stake in both questions – says Ricœur – is whether the duality between the time of 
the soul and cosmic time (our Chapter 1) and the duality between phenomenological time and 
objective time (our Chapter 2) are finally overcome in an analytic of Dasein (RICŒUR: 
1990(3), 80).  
Starting from this challenge proposed by Heideggerian philosophy, Ricœur can 
easily understand the problems that are posed by the ordinary concept of time and its 
genesis for the German thinker. The Innerzeitigkeit, which in Heidegger should mediate 
the relationship between the pure temporality of the Dasein and the historicity of 
everyday life, determines a levelling of the temporal “ek-stasis” to the present which is 
the oblivion of temporality itself. For Ricœur, in the end,  
by restoring the legitimacy of the within-the-world surroundings of Dasein, we risk yoking the 
understanding of Dasein once again to the categories of what is present-at-hand and what is 
ready-to-hand, categories under which, according to Heidegger, metaphysics as always tried to 
classify things, up to the distinction between the psychical and the physical (RICŒUR: 
1990(3), 82). 
Therefore, for Ricœur, even if Heidegger overcomes the oppositions of Augustin 
vs. Aristotle and Husserl vs. Kant by analyzing the temporality in the horizon of the 
Being-in-the-world, on the other hand he ends up falling in the same aporia of his 
illustrious predecessors once again. In fact, where Heidegger devalues chronological 
time, Ricœur sees the rise of a series of problems. The chronos, in fact, is for Ricœur no 
longer a fallen modality of existential time, but a real and effective form of time, which 
                                                        
6
 Cfr. Ricœur: 2004(a), 3-25 and 219-230. The sense of the Ricœurian approach is to bring to light the 
necessity to develop an epistemological attitude to the human sciences as a “long way” to the 
description of the human being. In this sense Ricœur criticizes the Heideggerian approach as a “short 
way” to the sense of the Being-in-the-world which jumps into the sense of Being, thus avoiding the 
critical course tracked by the human sciences. That track consists of an “archaeology of the subject”, a 
“teleology of the subject” and an “eschatology”. On this purpose see Rigobello: 2007, 7-17. 
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cannot be reduced to the kairetic dimension of the Dasein. It is necessary to underline 
the “incommensurability between human time and the time of nature” (Ricœur: 
1990(3), 89), which remains as a residual aporia in the Heideggerian investigation. 
Human time is in fact part of a wider horizon of time made up of millions of years. Such 
time cannot be reduced to a mere attachment of the phenomenological temporality; on 
the contrary that time is what puts in check the phenomenological concept of time, 
indicating its aporetical character. 
However this aporia for Ricœur is not a failure, but the inception for a reflexive 
work that should develop in extra-theoretical directions. It will be the task of the 
narrative dimension, both historical and fictional, to try to find a sort of conciliation 
between these two different views of time, with the aim to find a unitary sight of time as 
a “collective singularity”. In this sense the Ricœurian analysis of Time and Narrative 
fulfils the need to think of the relationship between the one and the multiplicity in an 
hermenutical horizon, being careful not to fall in the totalizing outcome of the Hegelian 
conception of history
7
. Time is in fact a principle of differentiation, of alteration, of 
pluralization. So, it is starting from that recovery of a plural dimension in a narrative 
horizon that can be generated a “hermeneutical schematism”, which can overcome the 
risk of totalizing, typical of all the metaphysics of the triumphal subject, in order to 
rediscover a wider concept of otherness which cannot be mediated in the absolute 
reflection. 
                                                        
7
 Ricœur criticizes the Hegelian conception of history and in particular the “totalizing temptation” which 
want to collect all of time in a final parousia (cfr. Ricœur: 1990(3), 193-206). For Ricœur, Hegel’s 
thought represents the greatest attempt in the history of philosophy to explain and resolve negativity 
and evil in the frame of a strong conceptuality. The Hegelian “work of negativity” in the philosophy of 
spirit is considered by the French philosopher the same as a “theodicy”. The idea of negativity in the 
Hegelian system is for Ricœur the higher attempt to integrate evil in philosophical conceptuality. This 
is why Ricœur defines Hegel’s thought on negativity as a great temptation that he wants to avoid by 
overcoming the Hegelian dialectic in a hermeneutics of narrativity. In any case it is always important 
to remember that a trace of the speculative thought remains in Ricœur’s philosophy as he tries to 
develop the phenomenology of time in the horizon of a reflective thought (cfr. Ricœur: 1990(3), 96). 
Ricœur recognizes his debt with the Hegelian thought as he defines his philosophy as a “post-Hegelian 
Kantianism”, an expression which Ricœur shares with Eric Weil (Ricœur: 2004(a), 412). With regard 
to the Ricœurian analysis of Hegel’s thought see also Ricœur: 1991, 227-245 and Ricœur: 2005, 171-
185. For an in-depth analysis of the relationship between Hegel and Ricœur see: Piercey: 2007, 26-38 
and Scott-Baumann: 2013, 67-87. For what concerns the problematic approach of an hermenutics of 
the person to the speculative theme I refer to Valori: 2009, 9-33. 
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2.Time, Narrative, Otherness. 
The task of narrative is to make possible a non-systematic, poetical mediation 
between existential time and natural time. For Ricœur it is necessary to collect with a 
reflective act a unifying synthesis, which can give reason to those two alternative ways 
of considering time. On this purpose says Ricœur:  
We can not think about cosmological time (the instant) without surreptitiously appealing to 
phenomenological time and vice versa. If the statement of this aporia outruns phenomenology, 
this aporia thereby has the great merit of resituating phenomenology within the great current of 
reflective and speculative thought (RICŒUR: 1990(3), 96). 
The aporia of temporality, read under a speculative and reflective light, shows its 
wealth, insofar as it looks for a conjunction between the two dimensions of temporality 
which the phenomenological analysis leaves detached. As previously noted the aim of 
the analysis of narrative is to avoid the absolute synthesis proposed by Hegel in which 
every singularity is overcome in the universality of the onto-theo-logical parousia of the 
principle. The aim of Ricœur’s thought is to safeguard the unique experience of the 
single existence whose interior tension can not be resolved in a universal system 
governed by an overruling logic. The relationship between time of nature and time of 
existence should be thought of in a poetical way, resisting the temptation of an absolute 
reason which should explain everything by submerging it under its logical mechanism. 
The sense of time, the being of time itself, can be understood only in an eschatological 
dimension in which the sense is never totally manifested. This is because time itself, as 
a condition of the comprehension of being, is at the same time what unconceals and 
conceals the being itself. In this sense eschatology means a wait which does not wait 
anything, an openness of time, both in its existential and natural dimensions, to what 
overcomes it which should always remain undetermined. This is why only poetry and 
not a logic of being can achieve this level of thought. And this is why the narrative has 
such an important role in Ricœur’s thought: besides the metaphor it has the power to 
bring together the differences, avoiding the risk of a sort of violence of thought. 
Narrative is in fact a way of collecting the differences of the “collective 
singularity” of time in a unitarian project, which is the plot in its always changing 
dimension. The “synthesis of the heterogeneous” typical of the narrative is based on the 
intersection of two differently related ideas of time.  The historical and the fictional 
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narrative in fact combine the cosmological and phenomenological ideas of time in 
different ways. But in any case, what really matters in the hermeneutics of the narrative 
held by Ricœur is the relationship with time that the human being maintains: on the one 
hand he takes care of the ended temporality in which his life is determined as a unique 
existence; on the other hand he needs to control the fleeting time in the continuous 
becoming of the beings in a perspective which is immeasurably wider than the inner 
time of the Dasein. The temporarily determined conscience is always striving to give a 
sense to those two dimensions of temporality: to give sense to life, waiting for an 
unavoidable death; to give sense to the becoming of the world in its over-existential 
dimension. 
In this sense the narrative, as a “synthesis of the heterogeneous”, becomes the 
place where it is possible to experience the otherness of time in its duality. This is the 
value of the Aristotelian mimesis proposed by Ricœur at the beginning of his analysis in 
Time and Narrative. The mimesis is in fact what permits a writer to bring together in a 
narrative the temporal variations both of the inner life of the subject and of the external 
becoming of the world. 
Time is in this sense a principle of alteration, of the becoming other of the self 
and of beings in general. So this is why, it bears repeating, the question of time is the 
metaphysical question par excellence: it concerns the relationship between the one and 
the other, between one and multiplicity. So, the narrative, and in particular the three 
levels of mimesis determined by Ricœur on the basis of the Aristotelian Poetics, have 
the task of unifying the multiplicity of the experience by collecting it in what Ricœur 
calls “imaginative variations”, which should be able to give a unified reason to the 
assorted events which take place in fleeting time. 
For Ricœur, the act of narrative configuration is the insertion of different events 
happening in the course of time into a Unitarian horizon of sense. It is an operation of 
making sense in a unification in the narrative, through which the narrated events and the 
characters involved are requested as necessary for the narrative itself. 
Therefore the comparison between the two different temporal worlds, as 
developed in the “imperfect mediation” typical of the narrative dimension, shows the 
possibility of a hermeneutics of otherness where a dialogical openness between the past, 
present and the future can be maintained. This temporal openness, in its always-
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unconcluded narrative mediation between the two forms of time, is what allows the 
otherness to be considered in an alternative way, rather than as classical thought has 
usually done. So, in this sense, in a position critical of Hegel’s thought, Ricœur affirms 
that it is not so certain that the “present” should be reduced to the “presence” as a 
parousia of the absolute (as both Hegel and Heidegger, in the end, asserted); instead, the 
present should be understood as  
the time of initiative – that is, the time when the weight of history that has already been made is 
deposited, suspended, and interrupted, and when the dream of history yet to be made is 
transposed into a responsible decision […]. Therefore it is within the dimension of acting (and 
suffering, which is its corollary) that thought about history will bring together its perpectives, 
within the horizon of the idea of an imperfect mediation (RICŒUR: 1990(3), 208). 
This is specifically the richness of the aporia of time in its relationship with 
narrative. The present is in fact the place where the insertion of one’s action in the 
becoming of one’s life and of the world in general is possible, even if one doesn’t really 
know what exactly will be the final result. It means that one’s action is not a creation 
but a part of a wider horizon which never stops to become, even if one always means 
that this becoming has a sense. So in the “imperfect mediation” offered by the analysis 
of the narrative, it is possible to see the complexity of thinking regarding time. As 
Ricœur himself recognizes at the end of Time and Narrative:  
Our meditation on time not only suffers from its inability to go beyond the bifurcation into 
phenomenology and cosmology, or even its difficulty in giving a meaning to the totality that is 
made and unmade across the exchanges between coming-towards, having-been, and being-
present – but suffers, quite simply, from not really being able to think time” (RICŒUR: 
1990(3), 261). 
Time in its dual sense can not be understood in its entirety by thought, but can 
only be hermeneutically meditated. The whole plot of the world and existence can not 
be understood in an one-dimensional way. The only thing that can be done is to leave 
open one’s mind to the wealth of stories which happen in time, just as water always 
gushes from the spring. With this assessment, however, Ricœur doesn’t want to be a 
misologist about the question of time. On the contrary he wants to bring to light the 
limits of absolute reflection in order to reconsider our defined point of view as the 
assumption which permits scholars to avoid the hubris of thought to become  “similar to 
God”. For Ricœur what is put in discussion with the analysis of the aporias of 
temporality  
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is not thinking, in any acceptation of this term, but the impulse – or to put it a better way, the 
hubris – that impels our thinking to posit itself as the master of meaning. Thinking encounters 
this failure not only in the occasion of the enigma of evil but also when time, escaping our will 
to mastery, surges forth on the side of what, in one way or another, is the true master of 
meaning (RICŒUR: 1990, 261). 
This renunciation of the hubris of thought, of the “will to mastery” which wants 
to submit everything to a logic of supreme identity, is indeed the most important result 
of the meditation on time and narrative
8
. It is only starting from this renouncement that 
is possible for the hermeneutics to rediscover a most originary sense of otherness, not 
only as a mere opposite of the identity, but as its onto-poetical and practical completion. 
The otherness is in fact the proper dimension in and through which the hermeutical 
thought moves, starting from the in-depth analysis of temporality. 
3.The Narrative Dimension of the Human Person and the Hermeneutics of 
Otherness 
The hermeneutics of narrative makes it possible to free time as a “collective 
singularity”, as a principle of pluralisation which critically faces the totalizing 
temptation of western metaphysics. Therefore, the fundamental acquisition reached by 
Ricœur is the basis on which it is possible to build up a philosophy concerning the other 
from the perspective of “oneself as another”. The narrative identity of the person is the 
backbone of the entire analysis dedicated by Ricœur to the idea of otherness. The aim of 
these present considerations is to illustrate that the thought on otherness is rooted in a 
reflection on temporality, reconsidered as a pluralizing principle which permits a 
comprehension of otherness in its richness of sense, rather than as a problem which 
should be resolved in a monolithic identity. Reflecting on the narrative dimension of the 
person means to underline the temporal characteristics of his experience as a basis for 
the interpersonal relationship. Being-in-the-world for Ricœur means not only to be 
                                                        
8
 This renounciation of the hubris reached by Ricœur in the end of Time and Narrative looks very similar 
to the Heideggerian renounciation of the “will to mastery”, previously announced by Schopenhauer’s 
and Nietzsche’s philosophy and also present in Jasper’s Existenzphilosophie. It is beyond doubt that 
the Ricœurian approach to the tragical theme has much in common with this horizon of sense. Tragedy 
is in fact the breaking point on which every totalizing temptation should finally smash itself. 
Fundamentally, tragedy means the impossibility to bring into a definitive unity the sense of a life, the 
sense of history, or the sense of being in general: it is the possibility of a radical break which signifies 
the end of the idea of a “triumphal subject”, “master of meaning”, and establishes the basis for a 
“broken” (brisée) subjectivity. Cfr. Ricœur: 1992, 241-249. 
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related to the environment which surrounds us, but also it means to be-in-relationship 
“with and for the others inside fair institutions”. 
This is the well-known “ethical tripod” on which is based the intersubjective 
dimension of the person in Oneself as Another. In this work the issue concerning the 
narrative dimension of the person is addressed in a key moment of the reflection on the 
otherness, precisely when Ricœur makes a decisive step from a substantialist 
determination of the self towards ethics as the central focus for a reflection on otherness 
in an intersubjective dimension.  
In his investigation on the sense of the “Self” Ricœur acts a transfer from the 
question “what?” to the question “who?”, by analyzing the work of Parfit titled Reasons 
and Persons. Here the American philosopher radicalizes the “puzzling cases”
9
 
previously announced in the philosophy of Locke and Hume. Those are mental 
experiments in which the idea of personal identity is proved by resorting to imaginary 
situations in which the subject, reduced to the physical element of the brain, can be 
easily deprived of his self-identity. Those limiting cases are described by paradoxical 
situations in which it is impossible to discern what makes an individual this person 
rather than another. The puzzling cases give place to the aporias of personal identity 
which are provoked by a reductionist idea of the relationship between mind and body, in 
virtue of which the entire content of the mind is identified with a brain track which can 




Compared to such alienation of the ego, Ricœur answers with a strong criticism, 
based on the idea of the temporality of the Self, which can not be absolutely reduced to 
a physical track and exchanged with another. The entirety of events which determine 
personal identity over a lifetime are so dynamically structured that the unrepeatability of 
the person is requested as the only sub-jectum (the Greek hypokeimenon) of all of them. 
Parfit’s argumentation is in fact based strictly on the reduction of the personal identity 
to those characteristics which can be objectivized allowing a physical cloning. 
                                                        
9
 Parfit: 1987, 245 ss. 
10
 Cfr. Ricœur: 1992, 135-136. Ricœur has deepen the question of the relationship between mind and 
body also in Ricœur-Changeux: 1998 and in Ricœur: 2004(b). 
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However, Ricœur underlines the puzzling cases are only mental experiments, 
because there is a dimension of the Self, which explicates in the fourth dimension of 
time, that can’t be reduced to a physical object. The temporal and dynamic horizon of 
the Self is the “ipseity”, which Ricœur dialectically relates to “sameness”, considered as 
the permanent identity of the person. The ipseity means the possibility for a plural unity 
of the Self, which represents a mediation between the two extremes of the exaltation 
and humiliation of the Cogito. The puzzling cases are indeed an example of a radical 
deconstruction of subjectivity whose main aim, in the intentions of Parfit, should be to 
free the individual from the egoistic attachment to himself. However, Ricœur points out 
how the final outcome of these mental experiments is not only the deconstruction of the 
“ego” but also of the “other”. This occurs because in general personal identity is 
destroyed by physical reductionism, which does not allow for differences but makes 
everyone uniform by reducing persons to interchangeable things. On the contrary, the 
dialectic of sameness and ipseity is what makes the maintenance of the identity of the 
“self” overcoming the centralizing power of the “ego” possible. 
The narrative dimension obviously plays a decisive role in the determination of 
this hermeneutical idea of identity that is open to otherness, rather than selfishly centred 
on itself. As Ricœur says at the beginning of the 6th part of Oneself as Another, 
dedicated to narrative identity: “The genuine nature of narrative identity discloses itself, 
in my opinion, only in the dialectic of selfhood and sameness. In this sense, this 
dialectic represents the major contribution of narrative theory to the constitution of the 
self” (RICŒUR: 1992, 140). 
Narrative theory as explained in Time and Narrative plays a key role in the 
determination of oneself as another. The narrative is very important for the transfer from 
the question “what?”, concerning the first level of determination of the Self, to the 
question “who?”, which is central for all following levels of investigation. The  
“synthesis of the heterogeneous” typical of time, or the “discordant concordance”, 
characteristic of the mimesis in all the three levels of its explanation, are the basis on 




                                                        
11
 As Ricœur says: “I propose to define discordant concordance, characteristic of the narrative 
composition, by the notion of the synthesis of the heterogeneous. By this I am attempting to account 
 
P E R I    v .  0 6    n .  0 2    2 0 1 4    p . 1 5 2 - 1 7 3  1 6 6   
Beginning with the Aristotelian mimesis, it is possible for Ricœur to contemplate 
a new kind of identity, capable of reconciling two opposed categories: identity and 
otherness. The notion of “plot” proposed by Ricœur in Time and Narrative is what 
allows us to mediate between identity and otherness. Specifically, the notion of “event” 
is the logical and narrative element in which identity, as the necessity, and otherness, as 
the contingency, come together in the plot: how many stories wouldn’t be the same 
without that certain occurrence, meeting or incident. Every story presents a 
reconciliation between chance and necessity, which make it possible to say: “it was 
supposed to be this way…” Every story, in other words, is a collection of blind events 
transfigured into a sensible connection. 
In this new kind of identity, proposed by the idea of plot, the “character” is the 
main agent and patient to whom and from whom events happen. This is why in Oneself 
as Another Ricœur feels the need to complete narrative theory by analyzing the 
“character”, remained on the sidelines in Time and Narrative. The character determines 
and suffers the events of a story and constitutes the key for the transfer from a theory of 
narrative to the narrative identity of the person:  
The decisive step in the direction of a narrative conception of personal identity is taken when 
one passes from the action to the character. A character is the one who performs the action in 
the narrative. The category of character is therefore a narrative category as well, and its role in 
the narrative involves the same narrative understanding of the plot itself. The thesis supported 
here will be that the identity of the character is comprehensible through the transfer to the 
character of the operation of emplotment, first applied to the action recounted; characters, we 
will say, are themselves plots (RICŒUR: 1992, 143). 
Character and plot are closely linked to each other. To explain this connection, 
the French thinker analyzes Kermode’s work The Sense of an Ending (Kermode: 2000). 
Here Ricœur finds a possible answer to the aporias proposed by Parfit’s puzzling cases. 
For Kermode there is a strict connection between plot and character, which can be seen 
in the contemporary novel. In particular Ricœur underlines how the dissolution of the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
for the diverse mediations performed by the plot: between the manifold of events and the temporal 
unity of the story recounted; between the disparate components of the action – intention, causes, and 
chance occurences – and the unity of the temporal form, which, in extreme cases, can disrupt 
chronology to the point of abolishing it. These multiple dialectics do no more, in my opinion, than 
make explicit the opposition, already present in the domain of tragedy according to Aristotle, between 
the episodic dispersal of the narrative and the power of unification unfurled by the configuring act 
constituting poiesis itself” (Ricœur: 1992, 142). With regard to the passage from the hermeneutics of 
narrative (Time and Narrative) to the hermeneutics of otherness (Oneself as Another) see in particular: 
Greisch: 1993, Jannotta: 1993, 53-57, Fornari: 1996. 
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plot matches the dissolution of the character. That means the character follows the 
destiny of the story, meaning that the identity of the character is shaped by the plot and 
vice versa. 
In this sense the theory of the character proposed by Kermode is for Ricœur the 
answer to the aporias demonstrated by Parfit with his puzzling cases. For the French 
thinker, the question concerns the two different ideas of identity proposed. In the case of 
Parfit, the idea of identity is reduced to the material relationship between mind and 
body, so that the brain can be physically reproduced, causing the dissolution of the 
ego
12
. On the other hand, considering the connection between plot and the identity of 
the character, the crisis of the contemporary novel puts in light how the imaginative 
variations can open the identity to the otherness on the basis of the temporal constitution 
of the narrative.  
What is at stake here is the dialectic of sameness and ipseity: Parfit plays with 
the possibilities of manipulation of sameness to destroy the basis of subjectivity; on the 
other hand, Kermode underlines the ipseity as the place where the Self can narratively 
variate its constitution, remaining himself in any case, even if he radically experienced 
himself as another. 
Ricœur set against the “technological dream” of the puzzling cases the “poetical 
dream” of the narrative dimension. In this sense the deconstruction of the ego can be 
technological or poetical with very different results. In the “technological dream” it is 
possible to see how the deconstruction of the self leads to a total alienation and 
eradication of the subject which admits the manipulation of the body in all its extreme 
consequences, reducing the ipseity to the physical sameness of a corpse without soul. In 
the “poetical dream”, instead, even if the variations of the self are pushed to the 
extreme, the dialectic of the sameness and of the ipseity isn’t nullified but however 
becomes productive of new experiences. Technical manipulation plays with the body in 
order to demonstrate that personal existence and its temporal dimension is an accidental 
detail; the poetical variation of the narrative dimension, on the contrary, plays with time, 
                                                        
12
 Many contemporary novels insist on this radical event of the dissolution of the ego. For example: 
Orlando (V. Woolf), The Metamorphosis (F. Kafka), Uno nessuno centomila e Il fu Mattia Pascal (L. 
Pirandello) Der Mensch ohne Eigenschaften (R. Musil). All these novels represent the inconsistance of 
the self in its temporal constitution. However, as Ricœur explains, the “poetical dream” of a 
deconstruction of the ego doesn’t mean its complete negation, but a way to experience the difference 
inside the Self. Reading a contemporary novel does not lead to madness, but to a more complete 
understanding of ourselves. 
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to show how it is an essential element of our being-in-the-world, in relationship with 
and for the other persons. Therefore, if technological manipulation leads to a total 
expropriation of the self, it poses serious ethical problems for the safeguarding of 
personal integrity; on the other hand, the poetical and imaginative variation of the 
narrative leads to an “appropriating expropriation”
13
, thanks to which the extreme 
alienation of the character, which occurs in many contemporary novels, can be 
comprehended by the reader and become an experience of his life, of his ipseity. 
The dialectic of sameness and ipseity substantiate of the strict correlation 
between the narrative dimension and the temporality of the existence. That’s why the 
narrative plays a central role in Oneself as Another: it’s the hinge between the act of 
describing (the answer to the question “what?”) and the act of prescribing (the answer to 
the question “who?”). The act of narrating means fundamentally to make a “synthesis of 
the heterogeneous”
14
 of the different elements of a life in its unity. It means to unify the 
multiplicity of experiences which constitute the concreteness of existence.  
This brings us back to the topic of the hermeneutics of otherness, which is the 
central issue of this analysis. The dialectical implication of sameness and ipseity is 
rooted in the narrative dimension, which creates a relationship between unity and 
multiplicity in a sensible life. The interaction between narrative and life determines 
what Ricœur, inspired by McIntyre, calls “the narrative unity of life” (Ricœur: 1992, 
                                                        
13
 With this expression I want to draw attention to another similitude with Heidegger’s thought as he 
explains the game of Ereignis and Enteignis as the manifestation of Sein in the poetical Being-in-the-
world. As Heidegger explains in his works on identity and difference and in his posthumous work 
Beiträge zur Philosophie (Heidegger: 1989), the relationship of man with the being in the Ereignis is 
carachterized by a sort of alienation of the self which should lead to a type of appriopriation in the 
sense of being itself. In other words the Being, and therefore the being that ourselves are,  for 
Heidegger can be understood only if we radically renounce our will of being the center of everything 
that surrounds us. This radical renouncement can be enacted only in a poetical dimension in which 
language ceases to be a form through which man rules over the world, in order to become the “house” 
of the Being itself (Heidegger: 1985). In this sense the Ricœurian consideration of narrative as a 
“poetical dream” shares a similar intention with Heideggerian thought, as it tries to demonstrate that 
only a poetical approach to the question of the self can lead to an open comprehension of who we are 
and the sense of life itself. 
14
 Ricœur recalls this concept of a synthesis of the heterogeneous from Kantian transcendental 
schematism. As is well known, the problem of Kantian schematism concerned the metaphysical 
problem of putting together the unity of the categories and the multiplicity of the sensory perception. It 
is the problem of the relationship between the one and the multiple as presented by Plato in his 
dialectical dialogues, and remembered by Ricœur in many of his works. Time is however the central 
element which permits the synthesis between the one and the multiple. Obviously, Ricœur opens up the 
Kantian idea of the “synthesis of the heterogeneous” to a wider horizon by shifting the sense of the 
synthesis from the categories to the narrative sense of the Being-in-the-world. For a deeper analysis of 
the problem see in particular Lewis: 1991, 183-206. 
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158)
15
. In this respect Ricœur underlines that “literature proves to be an immense 
laboratory for thought experiments in which this connection is submitted to an endless 
number of imaginative variations” (Ricœur: 1992, 159). The problem for Ricœur is in 
the end to demonstrate the connection between the world of the text and the world of 
the reader. This calls into question the hermeneutics of the text as delineated in the last 




How is it possible that the text can generate new direction in the real world of 
life? This is the place where all the lines of inquiry here analyzed converge: temporality, 
narrative and otherness. Every narrative is a story which comprehends other stories, just 
as every life is always related with other lives. We are “wrapped in the stories” as 
Ricœur says, paraphrasing the title of W. Schapp’s work Im Geschichten verstrickt 
(RICŒUR: 1992, 107/161 – 1990(1), 74). Everyone is in fact potentially involved in 
everyone’s life, just as in a novel where every character interweaves his story with those 
of other characters. So, the narrative shows this interconnection subsisting between the 
self and the other through the mediation of the narrative as poetical unification of the 
temporal experience. In that mediation all the fragments of life are composed in an 
imaginary synthesis which overcomes the temptation of a totalizing system. 
The narrative shows a poetical power of representation “in” and “from” which 
time itself can be comprehended in its variety of levels. Time is the place where the 
otherness occurs, and where it may become a non-contingent element of one’s life. This 
is the game of time: in which everything flows away in the infinity of an 
incommensurable past and future, but where is also possible to find the sensible 
intersections of one’s life with the other’s life. Time is a condition of the alienation, but 
also a condition of a kairetic connection of one’s existence with a world endowed of 
                                                        
15
 We can find the expression in McIntyre: 1981, 217-219. 
16
 The problem concerning the connection between the world of the text and the world of the reader is 
very important because it establishes the effectivity of the hermeneutical circle, entailing the ethical 
dimension as a consequence of the text on the practical judgement and, then, to the responsible action. 
As Ricœur says in From text to action: “The models of actions elaborated by narrative fiction are 
models for redescribing the practical field in acordance with the narrative typology resulting from the 
work of the productive imagination. Because it is a world, the world of the text necessarily collides 
with the real world in order to “remake” it, either by confirming or by denying it. However, even if the 
most ironic relation between art and reality would be incomprehensible if art did not both disturb and 
rearrange our relation to reality. If the world of the text were without any assignable relation to the real 
world, language would not be “dangerous”, in the sense in which Hölderlin called it so before both 
Nietzsche and Walter Benjamin” (Ricœur: 1991, 6). 
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sense where the others are not strangers, but possible companions on the journey of life. 
This dynamic takes place in the ipseity as the freest dimension of the self, where the 
poetical experiment of life can take shape. The ipseity is the hermeneutical dimension 
of the self where the otherness is admitted and requested as a necessary and coessential 
element of the ego. When we leave the ipseity free to experiment its own otherness, we 
open new possibilities of experience which put into practice the hermeneutical circle as 
a dialogical relationship of “oneself as another”. 
The ipseity is in fact the element of the self which has that peculiar interior 
differentiation in which the temporality of the being-in-the-world reveals its dynamic 
tension. And it is the ipseity that can understand the stories as a place where the 
differentiation of the self in the transformation of characters occurs. The narrative is the 
place where the otherness takes this sense, ceasing to be an obstacle on the track for the 
achievement of the identity of the “One”, but becoming ever more a distinctive element 
of the uniqueness of the person who is always “on” the track of his life, trying to reach a 
final sense in an eschatological horizon. 
That gift of sense, peculiar of the poetical form of the narrative, permits a 
systematization of temporality by virtue of which birth and death, choices and initiatives 
can be “read” under the light of a sense, for which the past, the present and the future 
cease to be a mere fragment scattered in the universe of the becoming contingence, in 
order to acquire a certain necessity, a badge of sense stolen to the absurdity of existence. 
 
In conclusion, it is possible to say that the ipseity, as the basis of “oneself as 
another”, is a synergistic point in which the tensions created by the relationship of time 
and narrative converge. The narrative network, the plot, in its essential relationship 
becomes the imaginative schema which permits us to read the otherness as an 
insuppressible element of the personal being. The relational being of the person is so 
determined, that the temporality in its narrative mediation, shows its prerogatives. The 
narrative demonstrate that time is not only a place of relativity in which everything 
changes without ever being (just as in the Platonic idea of becoming: aei gignomenon 
men oudepote de on), but also and above all a place of relationship and co-implication 
where occasions of intersubjective interaction are given as essentials for the spiritual 
life of every person. 
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The relationship in this perspective is a source of sense which passes through 
everyone’s life. The narrative gives us an imagine of it, by collecting in unity the 
scattered fragments of an existence thrown in the world, in the temporal becoming 
which brings everything with it. There where, with Nietzsche, we can say that there is 
no man, but only “fragments and limbs and horrendous fortuities”
17
, the narrative re-
weaves the plot of relationships bringing them to a renewed, even if difficult, unity. It is 
there that the other recovers his value, as an essential interference without which there 
would not be a plot and everything would return to a blind contingency. The 
hermeneutics of otherness therefore gives us the possibility, on the basis of time and 
narrative, to re-weave, even if in an always-uncertain way, that temporal relationship 
which everyone maintains with himself and with the other in the complex narrative plot 
that is life itself. 
 
                                                        
17
 This is what Zarathustra says in his speech Of Redempion: “Wahrlich, meine Freunde, ich wandle unter 
den Menschen wie unter den Bruchstücken und Gliedmassen von Menschen!/ Dies ist meinem Auge 
das Fürchterliche, dass ich den Menschen zertrümmert finde und zerstreuet wie über ein Schlacht- und 
Schlächterfeld hin./ Und flüchtet mein Auge vom Jetzt zum Ehemals: es findet immer dal Gleiche: 
Bruchstücke und Gliedmassen und grause Zufälle – aber keine Menschen!” (NIETZSCHE: 1994, 141-
142). As Ricœur points out in the introduction of Oneself as Another Nietzsche can be considered as 
one of the strongest critics of the Cartesian cogito (RICŒUR: 1992, 11-16); so, in this sense, the 
hermeneutics of otherness drafted by Ricœur is a decisive answer gave to the dramatic question poses 
by the German thinker, in order to reconsider the human personality under a new light. 
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